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Since Donald Trump took office in early 2017, US—Russian relations have not only failed to 
“unfreeze,” but have deteriorated even further with continued US sanctions against Russia and 
increasingly bitter “diplomatic wars,” “media wars,” and intensified geopolitical rivalry in the 
Middle East. The author of this paper proposes that continuous deterioration of US—Russian 
relations is not only the result of the disparity of power, mutual misalignment, and the sharp 
decline of mutual trust between the two countries, but also the result of a strong influence of 
their respective domestic political factors, reflecting that the US—Russian conflict is acceler-
ating the transition from an exogenous to endogenous one. The paper also argues that for a 
long time to come, “limited rivalry” will become the “new normal” of US—Russian relations. 
Against the background of profound adjustment and complex change ability of the interna-
tional situation, China needs to take a more active and proactive lead in the positive interac-
tion between China, the United States and Russia, avoid further escalation of the competition 
between the major powers, and jointly deal with the increasingly serious global and regional 
challenges through the trilateral cooperation between Russia, China and the United States.
Keywords: US—Russia Relations, China—Russia—US Trilateral Relations, Great Power Rela-
tions
When US President Donald Trump first came to power, he highly praised Russian 
President Vladimir Putin and expressed his willingness to improve the bilateral relations, 
which had rapidly deteriorated in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea. Senior Russian officials also had high expectations for breaking the deadlock 
with the US. However, the reality over the past year and more shows that the US—Russia 
relationship has not only failed to achieve “restart”, but almost entered a “system crash”. 
The two countries criticized each other with sharp words in many fields, and bilateral rela-
tions have further spiraled down. The status quo of US—Russia relations, which is influ-
enced by multiple factors, not only reflects the unbalanced strength and huge gap in mu-
tual understanding of the two countries, but also shows that the conflicts between the two 
sides are changing from exogenous to endogenous. In the coming period, the US—Russia 
relationship will evolve around the basic theme of “limited opponents”. The continued 
deterioration of bilateral relations has brought new variables to China’s management of 
major-country relations. For China, an important strategic choice should be bringing the 
China—US—Russia triangle into positive interactions, rather than more serious conflicts 
and even confrontation. 
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US—Russia Relations Falling to “Freezing Point”
Since Trump took office, the United States and Russia have been in tit-for-tat con-
flicts in many fields. The relationship between the two countries has fallen to the lowest 
point since the end of the Cold War. 
First, the United States has imposed more serious sanctions against Russia. Since 
the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the US has launched multiple rounds of sanctions on Rus-
sia. Trump, after coming to power, once intended to improve the bilateral relations with 
Putin, who he thought was also a “strong man” like him. However, due to the evolution 
of international situation and US domestic politics, Trump’s Russia policy has been under 
strong pressure from different political forces within the US. As a result, the momentum 
of US sanctions against Russia has not weakened, but instead got even stronger. In August 
2017, Trump reluctantly signed into law a sanctions bill on Russia, which was passed by 
both chambers of the Congress by an overwhelming majority the previous month [1]. 
The severity of this bill is manifested in five aspects. First, it identified ten types of targets 
that can be sanctioned. This list is a lot broader than previous “targeted” sanctions, with 
Russia’s related energy industries, military industrial enterprises, banks, and institutions 
accused of interfering in the 2016 US election all listed as targets. 
Second, the reasons for sanctions are broader. In addition to the Ukraine issue, they 
have been extended to “corruption”, “human rights violations”, “evasion of sanctions”, 
“provision of weapons to Syria” and “Russian behavior in the Eurasian region”. These al-
most cover all aspects of Russia’s internal and foreign affairs that make the US dissatisfied. 
Third, it declared that the US would never recognize any Russian action to change 
the territorial status quo by force, including in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, eastern 
Ukraine and Transnistria. This announcement has also drawn an insurmountable “red 
line” for completely lifting the sanctions.
Fourth, it provides that the President, when making “significant change” related to 
policy toward Russia, such as lifting sanctions and returning seized diplomatic property, 
shall report to the Congress, which has the right to veto the President’s decision. Such 
limits on the President’s diplomatic power by the Congress is very rare in American his-
tory. Undoubtedly, it has greatly reduced Trump’s space to adjust the Russia policy. Fifth, 
the sanctions have been incorporated into the US public law system. This means that even 
if there is a major turnaround in the US—Russia relations, it is much more difficult to 
amend this anti-Russian bill than to adjust an executive order. For example, the Jackson-
Vanik amendment to the Trade Act passed in 1974, intended to affect US trade relations 
with countries with non-market economies that restrict freedom of emigration and other 
human rights, was not abolished until 2012. 
It is foreseeable that the sanctions bill would become a major obstacle between the US 
and Russia and seriously hinder the improvement of bilateral relations. At the end of Janu-
ary 2018, the US Treasury Department expanded the sanctions list, covering an additional 
114 Russian politicians, including Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minis-
ter Sergey Lavrov, and 96 wealthy businessmen, on grounds of Russian “interference” in 
the 2016 US presidential election [2]. On April 6, the United States once again waved its 
“big stick” of sanctions: 24 individuals and 14 companies were added to the list including 
Secretary of Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir 
Kolokoltsev, CEO of Gazprom Alexey Miller, President of En+ Group Oleg Deripaska 
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and President of VTB Bank Andrey L. Kostin. Most targets in this round of sanctions are 
members of Putin’s “core circle”. Their assets in the US were frozen, and US citizens were 
prohibited from transaction with them. The US Treasury Department said that these peo-
ple and businesses were “more or less” related to the situation in Ukraine and Syria [3]. 
This is considered to be the most severe sanctions imposed by the Trump administration 
on Russia to date. As of now, 189 entities and individuals in Russia have been sanctioned. 
Second, the “diplomatic expulsion war” between the two sides was escalated. At the 
end of 2016, before leaving office, President Obama expelled 35 Russian “intelligence of-
ficers” and shut down two Russian diplomatic facilities in the United States with the excuse 
of Russia’s malicious cyber-attacks against the US and intervention in the US presidential 
election. In order to deliver goodwill to the new President Trump, Putin temporarily put 
aside the issue and did not immediately respond to the US actions. However, the “spring” 
of Russia—US relations did not arrive as expected. In July 2017, when the US imposed 
new sanctions on Russia, as a “delayed revenge,” the Russian government required the 
US diplomatic missions in Russia to cut its staff to 455, equivalent to the staff number of 
Russian missions in the US. In addition, it also denied the US embassy’s right to use two 
of its properties in Moscow from August 1. In response, the US required Russia to close its 
San Francisco consulate and two diplomatic agencies in Washington and New York, and 
greatly reduced, even once temporarily suspended, the issuance of visas for Russian citi-
zens to go to the US. Russia’s diplomatic agencies in San Francisco and Washington were 
also searched by the US. The strange intoxication of Russia’s former spy Sergei Skripal and 
his daughter in the United Kingdom in March 2018 again provoked bilateral tensions. On 
March 29, the United States ordered 60 Russian diplomats accused of “espionage” to leave 
the US within one week and closed the Russian consulate in Seattle. Russia, not to be out-
done, immediately ousted 60 US diplomats and closed the US consulate in St. Petersburg 
as an equivalent move.
Third, the “media sanctions war” between the two countries intensified. The two 
sides stepped up using their respective foreign agent laws and identified each other’s me-
dia outlets as “foreign agents”, greatly reducing the media’s space on their respective ter-
ritories. On November 13, 2017, according to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the 
US identified the RT TV network, which was sponsored by the Russian government and 
watched by 2 million people each week, as a foreign agent and revoked its qualification 
to interview in the US Congress. (On April 1, 2018, RT officially stopped broadcasting in 
the US.) In response, Putin signed an amendment about the media’s foreign agent status 
on November 25. According to this law, media outlets that receive financial support from 
foreign governments or foreign organizations shall be identified as foreign agents. On 
December 5, the Russian Ministry of Justice identified nine US and European media out-
lets, including the Voice of America, as foreign agents and implemented corresponding 
restrictions. Dmitry Peskov, Press Secretary for the President of Russia, accused the US 
authority of being arbitrary, and seriously violating the values of “freedom of speech and 
the press” that it advocated [4]. This “media sanctions war” reflects further escalation of 
the two countries’ contest in the field of values and propaganda. In the confrontation of 
the “information wars,” the media became both pioneers and victims.
Finally, the contest in the Middle East between the US and Russia entered a new stage. 
Since its military action in Syria on September 30, 2015, Russia has achieved multiple 
goals in the Middle East with strong military operations. It has not only hit the “Islamic 
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State” and saved the Bashar regime, but also gradually grasped the leading position in the 
Syrian situation and maintained the important geostrategic fulcrum on the eastern coast 
of the Mediterranean. More importantly, through active maneuver in the region, Russia 
consolidated its strategic cooperation with Iran, further united Turkey, and took the op-
portunity to approach Saudi Arabia, which effectively enhanced its geopolitical influence 
in the Middle East. At the same time, however, along with the improvement of anti-ter-
rorism situation in Syria, the “dividends” of the two countries on jointly countering ter-
rorism in this region have almost exhausted. As a result, conflicts and differences between 
the two sides gradually emerged again. The anti-terrorism cooperation, which had been 
built on weak foundations, was in danger of a total breakdown. At the beginning of 2018, 
it was reported that the US military killed more than 200 Russian mercenaries in Syria in 
its operations. Immediately following the poison gas attack in Douma, the largest town in 
rebel-held Eastern Ghouta on April 8, the US State Department immediately claimed that 
Russia “shall take full responsibility” if the incident involved deadly chemical weapons [5]. 
The US, the UK and France then raided on three target facilities in Syria. The proxy war 
in Syria between Russia and the US became more and more complicated and dangerous, 
with both sides facing huge risks of direct military conflicts. In addition, with the rise of 
Iran in the Middle East in recent years, the strategic cooperation among the United States, 
Israel and Saudi Arabia has further enhanced. In the future, it is still unclear whether the 
Middle East will witness the formation of two antagonistic camps, and how the US—Rus-
sia geopolitical game in the region will evolve.
Internal Logic for Deterioration of US—Russia Relations
The continuous deterioration of US—Russia relations is neither a result of sudden 
change, nor a mistake arising out of chance. The evolution of this relationship has pro-
found historical logic and realistic roots. A review of changes in the relationship over 
the past one year and more since Trump took office shows that the structural conflicts 
between the two countries are expanding from geopolitics and strategic balance to such 
fields as domestic politics and values. 
First, the power gap between the United States and Russia has further expanded and 
their strategic security relationship has gone out of balance with accelerated pace. Strength 
is the primary factor determining the extent of national interests and the existence of se-
curity threats. After the international financial crisis in 2008, the opinion of “America in 
decline” became popular. However, has the United States really declined? From a histori-
cal perspective, it is true that the hegemony and influence of the US is not comparable to 
that when the Cold War just ended. But compared with other countries in present day, the 
overall national strength of the US has not substantially weakened. As far as the US and 
Russia are concerned, the gap between the two countries’ strengths is not narrowing but 
widening. Economically, from 2008 to 2017, except for the negative growth in the first 
two years of the financial crisis, the GDP of the US grew between 1.5 % and 3 % for eight 
years [6]. In 2017, the US, with a GDP of $19.7 trillion, remained the largest economy in 
the world [7]. In contrast, Russia’s economic development in the past ten years was greatly 
affected by a series of negative factors, such as the financial crisis, the collapse of inter-
national oil prices, Western sanctions, and the tumbling of the ruble. The dollar-denomi-
nated GDP of Russia was almost stagnant at about $1.3 trillion [8]. In 2017, Russia’s GDP 
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was only 6.6 % of that of the US, and its per capita GDP (less than $9,000) was only 15 % 
of the US level (over $60,000). On the military front, the US defense spending in fiscal 
year 2018 reached $639.1 billion [9], while Russia’s dropped sharply from $66.4 billion at 
the peak in 2015 to $46 billion, only 7.2 % of the US budget [10]. Although the US is still 
concerned about Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal, the above data shows that despite an 
equally strong rival in the past, Russia today is no longer on the same level as the United 
States even in terms of military. The bilateral “balance” of strategic power is broken with 
greater speed.
Second, the two countries have wrong understanding of each other with mutual trust 
weakened sharply. Looking back on the interactions between the US and Russia since the 
beginning of the 21st century, the attitudes and opinions of the two countries have always 
been incompatible, no matter on the international political and economic order and se-
curity situation after the Cold War, or on the assessment of their own national interests 
and international status. The two sides’ stark differences in views regarding international 
strategy, world order and political values have fundamentally made it difficult for them to 
treat each other as equals and coexist peacefully. Instead, disputes, conflicts and confron-
tations have always been the “main theme” of the relationship.
Out of misgivings about Russia and resentment at its uncertain pattern of behavior, 
the United States has never really regarded Russia as a “normal state” or a “partner.” In 
early 20th century, the US had adopted a policy of isolation and interference toward the 
Soviet Russia after the October Revolution. The complicated alliance, formed at the height 
of the Second World War, was also put to an end not long after the war. During the Cold 
War, successive US administrations inherited the containment strategy proposed by Mr. 
George Kennan, guarding against, weakening and containing Russia. The conclusion of 
the Cold War, marked by the disintegration of Soviet Union, further strengthened the 
victor mentality of Americans. The US political elite determined that Russia had lost its 
global power status and been reduced to a second-tier country. In recent years, the US 
strategic community, through analysis of incidents like the Russia-Georgia war and the 
Ukraine crisis, has mostly come to the conclusion that Russia is a subversive force against 
the current international order, and has blamed the rising expansionist desire within Rus-
sian elite for a series of conflicts between the two countries.
More importantly, with the deepening of investigation on Russian meddling in the 
US election, the United States’ concerns about Russia are no longer confined to geopoliti-
cal ambitions, but have extended to Russia’s challenges to the political system and values 
of the US and its allies, as well as multiple threats to the US-led international order. The 
latest US National Security Strategy, released in December 2017, listed a series of Russian 
“crimes”, including: challenging American power, influence, and interests, attempting to 
erode American security and prosperity, determined to make economy less free and fair, 
to grow the military, and to control information and data to repress the society and ex-
pand its influence; developing advanced weapons and capabilities that could threaten the 
United States’ critical structure and its command and control architecture; using informa-
tion operations as part of its offensive cyber efforts to influence public opinion across the 
globe, blending covert intelligence operations and false online personas with state-funded 
media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls”; using informa-
tion tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies, and targeting me-
dia, political processes, financial networks, and personal data to interfere in the domestic 
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political affairs of countries around the world; creating an unstable frontier in Eurasia by 
combing ambition and growing military capabilities, thus increasing the risk of conflict; 
viewing NATO and the EU as threats, and dividing the US from its allies and partners to 
weaken US influence in the world; as a revisionist power, actively competing against the 
US and its allies and partners across political, economic, and military areas in order to 
shift international order in its favor and shape a world antithetical to US values and inter-
ests [11]. The American elite’s perception of Russia reflected in the new document forms 
the ideological basis for anti-Russian sentiments in the US, which is deeply rooted and 
hard to be resolved in the short term. 
The Russian elite, however, have another perspective. Russia always views itself as a 
“global power” and “one of the world’s independent poles.” It believes that it shoulders the 
sacred mission of a “Third Rome,” and still hopes to address international problems with 
the United States as equals, like in Soviet era. Objectively speaking, since the time of Peter 
the Great, Russia has been looking to the West wholeheartedly, but the West has never 
regarded it as “brother of the same blood” [12]. After the Soviet Union’s disintegration, 
Russia once regarded the United States as a potential ally and partner. However, during 
the difficult transition from a planned economy to a market economy, the US did not lend 
a hand to help Russia successfully survive the “painful period”. Instead, through NATO’s 
eastward expansion and “color revolutions,” the US constantly expanded its presence and 
influence in the “post-Soviet space”, thus compressing Russia’s strategic space. This has 
greatly eroded the dignity of Russian elite, and aroused their strong disappointment and 
dissatisfaction with the US and its Western allies. At the 2007 Munich Security Confer-
ence, Putin strongly accused the US of its unilateralist policy and abuse of force around 
the world [13]. After that, Russia began to adopt a series of measures to restore its geopo-
litical influence in the former Soviet area and challenge the eastward expansion of NATO 
and the EU. Some Russian experts have pointed out that the unfriendly attitude of Russian 
elite toward the United States is mainly “the consequence of the Russia policies adopted by 
the US-led Western countries,” including their neglect and contempt of Russia’s national 
interests, the provocative policies toward Russia’s allies and partners, and the habitual view 
of seeing Russia as a “loser” [14].
To this day, the extreme resentment and disappointment of Russian elite about the 
United states’ policy has been too hard to eliminate. As reflected in the opinion of Vladislav 
Surkov [15], who is Putin’s political aide and hailed as the “gray cardinal” of contemporary 
Russian politics, although Russia has been trying to integrate into the West for about four 
centuries, especially attempting to seek Western acceptance again since the end of the 20th 
century, it still failed to enter the Western threshold even if its population, industry and 
military strength were largely weakened. As he emphasizes, Russia is a hybrid country 
with its territory spanning Asia and Europe and its value blending Eastern and Western 
ideas. Its cultural and geopolitical affiliation is similar to the identity of a child born into 
a family with parents of different races. It is related to everyone, but it is not considered a 
relative by anyone. Russia needs to explore the third road, the third civilization, the third 
world, and the third Rome. Surkov’s view highlights the extreme disappointment and re-
sentment of Russian political elite under the context of all-round deterioration of Rus-
sia—US relations. It may mark a historic turn of Russia’s national development trajectory 
and identity: rather than pursue re-integration into the West after Soviet disintegration, 
Russia will seek to foster a unique “Eurasian civilization”.
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Finally, the so-called Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election and the 
strong repercussions in the US caused by this accusation have accelerated the transition 
of US—Russia conflicts from being exogenous to endogenous, which further increased 
the complexity of bilateral relations. For the US, who is accustomed to interfering in other 
countries’ internal affairs, the Russian “meddling” in its election has made its political cir-
cle feel “shameful”. Such hatred for Russia can hardly be pacified. Four committees of the 
US Congress as well as an investigation team headed by Special Counsel Robert Mueller 
for the Justice Department have been looking into the alleged collusion between Trump’s 
campaign and Russia. While National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and Secretary of 
State Rex Tillerson, who are known for their knowledge about Russia, resigned, the new 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton have adopted 
a hawkish hardline attitude toward Russia. It can be said that the relationship with Russia 
has become a highly sensitive issue in the US domestic politics, and “anti-Russian” has 
been a kind of “political correctness.” In the meantime, in Russia, “anti-America” has also 
served as an important tool for the authorities to shape “external enemies” and create do-
mestic political consensus.
In fact, the endogenous evolution of the US—Russia conflict has an inevitable logic. 
Due to the widening gap between the two countries’ strengths, the previous bilateral agen-
da centered on dialogues about global strategic stability has become increasingly hollow, 
while the economic ties are too weak for them to carry out win-win cooperation. There-
fore, trying to interfere in each other’s domestic politics becomes their inevitable choice, 
which has extended the bilateral structural conflicts from global security and geopolitics 
to domestic politics. This situation has further aggravated their mutual understanding, 
causing the US—Russia relationship to fall into a deteriorating “negative cycle”.
Limited Opponents: “New Normal” of US—Russia Relations
The spiral decline of US—Russia relations has made many experts believe in the ar-
rival of a “New Cold War”. This expression, however, is not appropriate. The Cold War is 
a specific concept and status. It means all-round competition between two superpowers, 
all-round antagonism between two ideologies, all-round confrontation between two mili-
tary camps, and incompatibility between two parallel markets. The current US—Russia 
relationship does not have these characteristics at all. In terms of national strength, Russia 
is no longer as strong as the former Soviet Union. Regarding ideology, Russia has basically 
accepted Western values. Although Russia’s domestic political conservatism has prevailed 
in recent years, there is no such issue as “export of revolution” to the West. On the military 
level, it is true that Russia has established the Collective Security Treaty Organization with 
itself at the core, and the US-led NATO and the alliance system in Asia still exist, but it is 
impossible for the two sides to enter an all-round military confrontation. As for economy, 
the parallel market with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance at the core has long 
ceased to exist, and it is impossible for Russia to rebuild an isolated economic system. 
The evolution of international situation and the status quo of US—Russia relations have 
already transcended the Cold War.
In the opinion of the US scholar Angela Stant, “limited partnership” would be the 
new normal of US—Russia relations in the 21st century [16].
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However, developments since the Ukraine crisis have shown that the US and Russia 
have become rivals rather than partners. The two sides have been contesting fiercely in 
geopolitics, strategic security and domestic politics. However, at the same time, we shall 
not fail to see that such contest is limited in terms of intensity, breadth and impact. It is 
more regional than global, and more specific than holistic. In view of the development 
trend of global order and the two countries, “limited opponents” is becoming the “new 
normal” of US—Russia relations for a long time to come.
First of all, the obvious gap in national strength has made Russia unable to rival the 
US on a global scale. Economically, Russia lags far behind the US in terms of both eco-
nomic size and per capita GDP and is increasingly at the edge of the world economy and 
international division of labor. Regarding science and technology, the US remains the 
world’s No 1  innovation power, especially in core technologies and frontier industries 
such as commercial aircrafts, semiconductors, biotechnology, special chemicals and sys-
tem software. In contrast, Russia’s scientific and technological strength is greatly impacted 
by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Moreover, it also suffers from the loss of relevant 
talents. For a long time, its economic development relies heavily on the export of raw ma-
terials. Worse still, the low international oil prices have made its financial system highly 
overstretched. To a large extent, Russia has lost the objective conditions for a vigorous 
development of innovative industries. Militarily, compared with the Americans’ strong 
leadership in global military revolution, Russia is in a disadvantageous position in strat-
egy, technology and army building.
Second, as bilateral conflicts are difficult to be resolved, the two countries will remain 
in serious antagonism in the next few years. In terms of geopolitics, the contradiction 
between the US contempt for Russia’s traditional “sphere of influence” and Russia’s strong 
dignity and sense of insecurity as a major power is difficult to fade away. The “post-Soviet 
space” is still the main battlefield for the two countries. Concerning military strategic bal-
ance, the United States has accelerated the development of aerospace weapons, hypersonic 
weapons, anti-missile systems and cyber warfare capabilities, while Russia is focusing on 
expanding its nuclear arsenals and information warfare forces as asymmetrical responses. 
The risk of conflicts has not reduced. Regarding domestic politics, while the investigation 
of Russian interference and collusion has caused continuous ramifications in the US, the 
anti-American sentiments in Russia have also reached a peak. The trajectory of US—Rus-
sia relations will continue to be constrained by internal factors of the two countries. As far 
as values are concerned, the competition between the universal values advocated by the 
US-led West and Russia’s conservative tendencies is also getting fierce. The two countries 
will continue to seize the high ground of international public opinion and fight for their 
discourse power through the “media war”. It is predicted by Russian scholar Dmitry Sus-
lov that before the US election in 2020, the US—Russia relationship will remain at a low 
point and can hardly witness significant changes for the better [17].
Finally, subjectively neither the United States nor Russia regards the other as the ma-
jor threat. For the US, the National Security Strategy, the Nuclear Posture Review and the 
National Defense Strategy, released successively from the end of 2017, all believe that great 
power competition has replaced terrorism as the major external threat to US national secu-
rity, and that China and Russia are “revisionist powers” and “strategic rivals”. However, in 
view of the reality of the two countries, the US believes that Russia poses a real and urgent 
threat while China is a long-term challenge. In July 2017, Pompeo, then Director of the US 
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Central Intelligence Agency, said in his first interview that while China, Russia and Iran will 
all pose major challenges to the United States in the future, China, as an economic pow-
erhouse with constantly strengthened military strength, is reducing American influence 
worldwide and presents the greatest rivalry to the US over the medium and long term [18]. 
In an interview with BBC on January 30, 2018, Pompeo once again asserted that Chinese 
efforts to exert covert influence over the West are just as concerning as Russian subversion, 
and the Chinese “have a much bigger footprint” to do this than the Russians do [19]. Given 
that Pompeo has now assumed the role of Secretary of State, his views will largely influence 
the US strategic decision-making. From Trump’s recent insistence on launching a trade war 
against China, it can be seen that the US is increasingly concerned about the rising strength 
and influence of China, and the strategic competition between the two major countries has 
unfolded. On the other hand, Russia has long been looking to the West, and Putin is not a 
downright anti-American president. In many speeches even after the Ukraine crisis, Putin 
still indicated that Russia would always “open its doors” and hoped to develop “construc-
tive relations” with the United States. Some experts even believe that the anti-American 
sentiments among Russian elite nowadays are mostly due to their disappointment with not 
being accepted by the West. If the US actively sought to improve relations with Russia, it 
is quite possible that anti-Americanism in Russia would quickly subside [14]. Moreover, 
the main challenge facing Putin after his re-election is to develop Russia’s economy. He has 
indicated on many occasions that he will shift his focus to the domestic agenda.
During US National Security Advisor John Bolton’s visit to Russia in late June 2018, 
the two sides agreed that Trump and Putin would meet in Helsinki, Finland on July 16. 
This is Trump’s attempt to make a new breakthrough in diplomacy, with an eye to the up-
coming mid-term elections and presidential re-election, after making important progress 
on the DPRK nuclear issue and imposing more pressure on Iran. It also reflects Putin’s 
urgent appeal for alleviating the strategic pressure from the US and improving the inter-
national environment facing Russia. It can be expected that the two countries would reach 
a certain compromise on the Syrian situation and the extension of the 2010 New Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
This being said, there has not been a fundamental change in the balance of nation-
al strengths and mutual understanding. With the existence of their disputes concerning 
Crimea and Russian interference in US elections, the US—Russia relationship is far from 
an overall recovery or “restart”.
China—US—Russia Trilateral Relations and China’s Policy Choice
As US—Russia relations continue to deteriorate and China—US relations enter the 
“deep water zone,” the trilateral relations among the three sides have once again become a 
hot topic in the strategic studies circle. Some Chinese scholars advocate “uniting Russia to 
fight against the US”, while some in Russia have also proposed building an “anti-US united 
front” with China and other countries. The debate on China—Russia “alignment” has 
long been existent in the US political and academic circles. In this context, the trilateral 
relations among China, the US and Russia are still similar to the China—US—Soviet rela-
tionship during the Cold War, which does not transcend the mentality of alignment and 
confrontation. According to traditional geopolitical theory and game theory, a de facto 
alliance between China and Russia would definitely weaken the pressure from the US and 
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bring other benefits. However, the complexity of contemporary international relations 
makes this assumption somewhat illusory. More importantly, the Chinese and Russian 
governments have officially stated that they will not form an alliance. Therefore, although 
further cooperation between the two countries may objectively upset and put pressure on 
the US, the real returns cannot be accurately estimated. It is even more difficult to control 
the spillover of negative effects.
First, the multi-faceted nature of national interests determines that the model of al-
liance and confrontation cannot meet the actual interests of the three countries. It is true 
that power is the core concept of realist international relations theory, but in reality every 
country is faced with a whole set of tasks, including promoting economic development, 
maintaining social stability, safeguarding national security, and improving governance. At 
present, all three countries are challenged by increasingly pressing economic and social 
problems. The alignment of China and Russia to counter the United States will do no favor 
to solving more prioritized issues in either country such as economic transformation and 
domestic political stability. It is also true for the United States.
Second, the limited effectiveness of the existing pattern determines that the alliance 
and confrontation model will not live up to the expectations of its advocates. According to 
those who support China—Russia alliance, the two countries’ cooperation in countering 
the US can largely reduce the pressure from the US and expand their respective strategic 
leeway. In fact, however, the China—Russia partnership of strategic coordination has nei-
ther prevented the US from continuing to strengthen military presence in Eastern Europe, 
nor has it stopped the US military operations in the South China Sea, or forced the US to 
abandon the deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea.
Third, the complexity of international agenda determines that the model of alliance 
and confrontation cannot solve urgent international and regional problems. Today’s in-
ternational relations are not only confined to geopolitics, but also include a wide range 
of agendas such as climate change, the scientific and technological revolution, and the 
reshaping of financial, trade and investment rules. Each agenda has its own characteris-
tics, attributes, logic and rules. The common and vague ideas of geopolitics and the simple 
model of alignment and antagonism will do no help to solve complex international prob-
lems. For example, the reinforcement of local currency swap between China and Russia 
does not directly affect the hegemony of the dollar.
Fourth, working together to counter the US is not in accordance with the principle 
basis of China—Russia relations or the subjective will of the two countries. China—Russia 
relations are based on equality, mutual benefits, reciprocity, win-win cooperation, mutual 
respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. In a large number of political 
statements, the two countries have reiterated the basic principles of “non-alignment, non-
confrontation, and no targeting at any third party.” Non-alignment has been a steadfast 
feature of the bilateral relations. As a product from the wartime era and the Cold War 
period, the term “alignment” has long lost its foundation of existence. In the context of 
complex and ever changing international situation, working together for common pro-
gress is the most appropriate and comfortable way for China and Russia to get along with 
each other. At least for the time being, neither of them has the will or ability to lead the 
other and establish a “leadership” in this partnership.
The looseness of contemporary China—US—Russia relations indicates that there is 
still a lack of close interaction between the three countries. In fact, the three pairs of bi-
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lateral relations, namely China—US, China—Russia and US—Russia relationships, have 
their respective values, problems and development logic. The alignment of China and 
Russia actually cannot help solve the problems in China—US or Russia—US relations. 
On the economic front, the strengthened China—Russia economic cooperation cannot 
fully eliminate the impacts of US sanctions on Russia. In the security field, the interaction 
between China and Russia cannot address the security concerns between China and the 
US. The US will not accordingly reduce its security misgivings about China, nor will it 
relax its military pressure on China.
In summary, the traditional model of alliance and confrontation does not serve the 
interests of any of the three countries. Whether for their own development, or for interna-
tional and regional peace and stability, the three countries need to explore a positive way 
of interaction, solve their respective problems through trilateral cooperation, and assume 
the responsibility of maintaining global peace and promoting world development. As the 
Russian Ambassador to China Andrey Denisov said, “The interaction among Russia, Chi-
na and the United States in solving international problems can bring obvious benefits to 
the improvement of the international situation” [20]. Of course, the transition from the 
old to the new model will be a daunting task that can hardly be done overnight. But only 
by setting such a goal and taking concrete actions, can the three powers of China, the US 
and Russia transcend geopolitics, and truly play a constructive role and work together 
with other countries in the world to tackle global challenges. 
Specifically, China, the United States and Russia can cooperate in the following areas.
First, jointly maintaining security in Northeast Asia and providing a holistic so-
lution. Relevant authorities of the three countries may first establish an expert-level 
mechanism to jointly explore the possible risks of North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
development, discuss the actual effects of THAAD, as well as subsequent implications. 
Based on careful analysis of crisis scenarios and response programs, the three countries 
should seek political compromises, and carry out comprehensive discussion and con-
sultation on a wide range of issues, such as establishment of regional nuclear non-pro-
liferation mechanisms, provision of security guarantee for non-nuclear states by nuclear 
powers, and the challenges of missile defense deployment to regional strategic balance, 
with an aim to provide a package solution to regional security. Given the recent positive 
developments on the Korean Peninsula, it is even more necessary for the three countries 
to discuss the future trajectory of the Peninsula and the long-term security arrange-
ments in Northeast Asia.
Second, carrying out effective counter-terrorism cooperation, and fostering security 
mutual trust through non-traditional security cooperation. The three countries need to be 
fully aware of the danger of double standards in counter-terrorism, and further strengthen 
cooperation in formulating a unified list of terrorist organizations and personnel under 
the UN and G20 frameworks to cut off the funding channels of terrorist organizations. 
They should also explore ways to combat the remnants of the “Islamic State”, and discuss 
solutions to the global spread of extremism.
Third, curbing the risk of an arms race and seeking new ways to maintain interna-
tional strategic balance. With the accelerated advent of a new round of military revolu-
tion, both the United States and Russia have been stepping up modernization of nuclear 
arsenals, and China’s strategic nuclear power has also made progress. At the same time, 
the three countries have also started competition in the fields of global rapid strike sys-
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tem, missile defense system and cyber warfare. Due to multiple factors, the existing inter-
national arms control and disarmament regime is increasingly fragmented with rapidly 
declining effectiveness. In order to avoid a new arms race and consolidate international 
security, China, the US and Russia should work with other military powers to conduct 
practical negotiations on arms control and disarmament in nuclear, outer space and cy-
berspace fields.
Fourth, from trilateral think tank exchanges, seeking cooperation areas and fos-
tering mutual trust through Track II dialogue and joint research. There were similar 
exchanges in the past, but it is necessary to alter the previous practice that no follow-up 
was conducted after meetings. A research team composed of experts from the three 
countries should be established to study problems in the trilateral relationship, explore 
cooperation space and paths, and provide the three governments with corresponding 
policy reference.
At present, the international order is undergoing accelerated transformation, and 
global and regional challenges are on the increase. At the same time, however, there is 
a lack of effective solutions for global and regional governance. The relations among 
major powers are still largely confined to the traditional geopolitical model, which fails 
to truly respond to global challenges. Facing the real challenges, the three countries and 
beyond will see greater security threats if they are not able to cope with the “prisoner’s 
dilemma”. The exploration of a concrete path to achieve positive interaction among 
China, the United States and Russia calls for joint efforts of the three sides’ political and 
academic circles.
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